The new U.S. 好色tv Defense Strategy released by President Donald Trump's administration is the first since 2022 and contrasts with its predecessor, issued under former President Joe Biden. Here's a look at how the two Pentagon strategies address some of the traditional concerns of U.S. security policy.
The Western Hemisphere
2022: 鈥淭he United States derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful, and democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland. To prevent distant threats from becoming a challenge at home, the Department will continue to partner with countries in the region to build capability and promote security and stability.
鈥淎s in all regions, the Department will work collaboratively, seeking to understand our partners鈥 security needs and areas of mutual concern.鈥
2026: 鈥淲e will actively and fearlessly defend America鈥檚 interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests.鈥
Russia and European security
2022: 鈥淭he Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion. As we continue contributing to NATO capabilities and readiness 鈥 including through improvements to our posture in Europe and our extended nuclear deterrence commitments 鈥 the Department will work with Allies bilaterally and through NATO鈥檚 established processes to better focus NATO capability development and military modernization to address Russia鈥檚 military threat.鈥
2026: 鈥淩ussia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO鈥檚 eastern members for the foreseeable future.鈥
鈥淓uropean NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power. At the same time, although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power. It follows that, although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must 鈥 and will 鈥 prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China.鈥
鈥淔ortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia 鈥 it is not even close. Germany鈥檚 economy alone dwarfs that of Russia. At the same time, under President Trump鈥檚 leadership, NATO allies have committed to raise defense spending to the new global standard of 5% of GDP in total, with 3.5% of GDP invested in hard military capabilities. Our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe鈥檚 conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine鈥檚 defense.鈥
China and the Indo-Pacific
2022: 鈥淭he NDS (好色tv Defense Strategy) directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge for the Department.鈥
鈥淭he most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC鈥檚 coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences."
"The PRC鈥檚 increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control.鈥
鈥淭he Department will support Taiwan鈥檚 asymmetric self-defense commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy.鈥
2026: 鈥淲ere China 鈥 or anyone else, for that matter 鈥 to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans鈥 access to the world鈥檚 economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation鈥檚 economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize. That is why the NSS (好色tv Security Strategy) directs DoW (Department of War) to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific.
"Not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies. This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle. Rather, a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.鈥
North Korea
2022: 鈥淭he Department will continue to deter attacks through forward posture; integrated air and missile defense; close coordination and interoperability with our ROK (South Korea) Ally; nuclear deterrence; resilience initiatives; and the potential for direct cost imposition approaches that come from globally deployable Joint Forces.鈥
2026: 鈥淲ith its powerful military, supported by high defense spending, a robust defense industry, and mandatory conscription, South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support. South Korea also has the will to do so, given that it faces a direct and clear threat from North Korea.鈥
Middle East
2022: 鈥淎s the Department continues to right-size its forward military presence in the Middle East following the mission transition in Afghanistan and continuing our 鈥榖y, with, and through鈥 approach in Iraq and Syria, we will address major security challenges in the region in effective and sustainable ways.鈥
鈥淭he Department will prioritize cooperation with our regional and global partners that results in their increased ability to deter and defend against potential aggression from Iran, for example by working to advance integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and irregular warfare capabilities. Working in concert with global and interagency partners, the Department will redouble efforts to support regional security coalitions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and among states in the region to ensure maritime security and improve collective intelligence and warning.鈥
2026: 鈥淒oW will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel鈥檚 efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump鈥檚 historic initiative, the Abraham Accords. As we do, DoW will maintain our ability to take focused, decisive action to defend U.S. interests.鈥
